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South Africa’s liberation, marked by the first democratic elections of 1994,
ushered in an unprecedented expansion of large-scale redistributive arrange-
ments. In the post-apartheid period, the collection of money into a central
fund administered anonymously and bureaucratically has gained social and
political importance, particularly for poor and lower-middle-class Africans.
This is most evident in a rapid expansion of government social assistance—
from 1997 to 2006 the number of beneficiaries of social grants increased
from three to almost eleven million, and today at least a quarter of South
African households receive welfare payments.1 Social assistance “has been
the fastest-growing category of government expenditure since 2001, and now
amounts to R70 billion [almost US$7 billion in 2006] a year, about 3.4
percent of gross domestic product.”2 The centrality of redistribution is clear
in current debates over the establishment of a Basic Income Grant (BIG) for
all South Africans.3 Political liberation has also brought an increase in
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redistribution through development projects such as the National Reconstruc-
tion and Development Programme (RDP) and Black Economic Empowerment
(BEE) grants.4
The surge in redistributive arrangements is also notable in an increase in
commercial insurance purchases by the mostly African poor and lower
middle classes. In South Africa, expenditures on insurance, mostly by the pre-
dominantly White elite and upper-middle classes, are already very high,
making up 14.5 percent of GDP, almost three times U.S. levels.5 Driven by
both commercial interests and government pressures, the insurance sector is
exploring new markets among less affluent and predominantly African
clients.6 The rise of large-scale redistribution is also apparent in the popularity
of prosperity churches,7 which urge their congregations to donate large sums
and preach that they will gain vast riches in return. They also discourage the
maintenance of reciprocal obligations toward kin and neighbors. Though
these churches are relatively small, they have grown rapidly since the second
half of the 1990s.
Redistribution, then, has become central across the otherwise disparate
realms of state support, the insurance market, and religion. We can identify
three basic trends that have contributed to the rise of large-scale redistributive
arrangements since political liberation. First, liberation has been accompanied
by rising unemployment and continued poverty. Only a minority of Africans has
escaped poverty, and many remain poor or have become poorer still. From 1995
to 2004, inequality rose by 6 percent.8 From 2000–2005, the labor-participation
4 For the principles of the RDP, see I. Turok, “Restructuring or Reconciliation? South Africa’s
Reconstruction and Development Programme,” International Journal of Urban and Regional
Research 19 (1995): 305–18. On BEE, see S. Ponte, S. Roberts, and L. van Sittert, “‘Black Econ-
omic Empowerment,’ Business and the State in South Africa,” Development and Change 38
(2007): 933–55.
5 The South African figure comes from the insurance report 2004Q4, Business Monitor Inter-
national (Mermaid House, London, 2004), 3. For other countries, “according to a study by the
Insurance Information Institute, expenditures on non-life insurance in 2003,” see: marginalrevolu-
tion.com/marginalrevolution/2005/02/insurance_fact_.html. The U.S. expenditure is given as 5.23
percent of GDP.
6 D. Porteous, “The Access Frontier as an Approach and Tool in Making Markets Work for the
Poor,” Working Paper by Bankable Frontier Associates for the UK Department for International
Development (DFID), 2005, at: bankablefrontier.com/assets/access-frontier-as-tool.pdf.
7 For an analysis of Pentecostal-Charismatic Churches in Africa, see B. Meyer, “Christianity in
Africa: From African Independent to Pentecostal-Charismatic Churches in Africa,” Annual Review
of Anthropology 33 (2004): 447–74. On the UCKG in South Africa, see I. van Wyk, “Profit Pro-
phets and God’s Money:” The Making and Unmaking of Riches in the Universal Church of the
Kingdom of God in Durban, South Africa (PhD thesis, London School of Economics, 2007). On
the Assemblies of God in South Africa, see K. Helgesson, “Walking in the Spirit”: The Complexity
of Belonging in Two Pentecostal Churches in Durban, South Africa (PhD thesis, Uppsala Univer-
sity, Sweden, 2006).
8 P. G. Leite, T. McKinley, and R. Guerreiro Osorio, “The Post-Apartheid Evolution of Earnings
Inequality in South Africa, 1995–2004,” Working Paper 12, UNDP, International Poverty Centre,
2006, 16. For details on the gini index in South Africa, see Human Sciences Research Council
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rate of Africans dropped by nearly 20 percent. Though nearly all educated Afri-
cans are employed, large numbers of the uneducated have never had a job.9
Cape Town, where I conducted most of my research, is no exception, and
indeed it has the highest poverty rate of all South African cities, at 30
percent. The Eastern Cape, which includes the former Xhosa bantustans
(native reserves) of Transkei and Ciskei, which so many have left to seek
work in Cape Town, is the country’s second-poorest province with a staggering
poverty rate of 77 percent.10 While political liberation legally and politically
incorporated Africans into the economy, jobs actually became scarcer while
entrepreneurial opportunities remained few. The continued exclusion of
people from markets raises their hopes that they will find a prosperous future
through large-scale redistributive arrangements.
Second, the South African government has tried to alleviate the inequalities
of the past via redistribution through acts such as the 1994 Bill of Rights that
guaranteed the extension of welfare to all South Africans irrespective of race.
The government has also instituted policies that provide for land redistribution,
expansion of social grants, and a myriad of development projects. Further, it
has urged financial institutions such as insurance companies to offer their pro-
ducts and services to Africans and Coloureds on a much larger scale than they
did during apartheid. For many South Africans, political liberation has become
apparent through access to and inclusion within these redistributive
arrangements.
The third trend is that, despite political liberation, pressures on reciprocal
relations, particularly among kin and neighbors, have persisted and intensified,
due to factors that include high levels of inequality, violence, and AIDS. These
place great strain on kinship and neighborhood relations because they limit
people’s ability to care for others. It may be that redistributive arrangements
are popular among the African poor and lower-middle classes because
people expect them to provide not only wealth but also an escape from pressing
reciprocal obligations. In this way, large-scale redistribution not only increases
(HSRC), “Factsheet Poverty in South Africa,” Factsheet no. 1, at: www.sarpn.org.za/documents/
d0000990/P1096-Fact_Sheet_No_1_Poverty.pdf (26 July 2004).
9 Statistics South Africa, “Labour Force Survey September 2000 to March 2005: Historical
Series of Revised Estimates,” Statistics South Africa, Report P0210, 2005, 10, 19. On rising unem-
ployment in post-apartheid South Africa, and its causes, see G. Kingdon and J. Knight, “Unemploy-
ment in South Africa, 1995–2003: Causes, Problems and Policies,” Journal of African Economies
16, 5 (2007): 813–48; and G. Kingdon and J. Knight, “What Have We Learnt about Unemployment
from Microdatasets in South Africa?” Social Dynamics 27, 1 (2001): 79–95, quote p. 90. Branson
argues that the increasing unemployment among Africans is due to young people leaving school
earlier and thus entering the labor market at a younger age: N. Branson, “The South African
Labour Market 1995–2004: A Cohort Analysis,” SALDRU Working Paper 7, Cape Town, 2006.
10 HSRC, Factsheet no. 1, 1.
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dependency on bureaucratic and impersonal external agents but also
undermines cooperation among neighbors and kin.
The ongoing and lively academic debates concerning economic transform-
ation are captured with concepts such as the neoliberal economy,11 post-
Fordism,12 the millennial economy,13 casino capitalism,14 and the risk
society.15 Anthropological studies, in particular, have explored the sociality
of changing markets and its relationship to non-market forms of exchange
such as reciprocity and gift exchange, and various forms of solidarity.16 In
the heat of these debates, insufficient attention has been paid to large-scale
redistribution as a distinct mode of exchange and its sociality.
The rise of redistribution raises fundamental questions about sociality and
mutual dependencies. The breakdown of reciprocity and moral obligations
cannot be, as Polanyi argued, attributed to markets alone.17 When diverse insti-
tutions are infused by redistribution, it becomes difficult to distinguish redistri-
bution from other forms of economic integration; the rise of commercial
insurance (and one might provocatively add prosperity churches) blurs distinc-
tions between the realm of the market and that of redistribution. Redistribution
is not the separate form of economic integration that Polanyi took it to be: it is
entangled with and a part of markets (commercial insurances), the state (social
grants and development aid), and religious institutions (prosperity churches).
This is an important complication of the redistribution concept generally. For
many in South Africa and elsewhere, the market manifests itself through redis-
tribution, with unexpected consequences for reciprocity and the accumulation
11 R. Abrahamsen, “The Power of Partnerships in Global Governance,” Third World Quarterly
25 (2004): 1453–67; J. Elyachar, “Empowerment Money: The World Bank, Non-Governmental
Organizations, and the Value of Culture in Egypt,” Public Culture 14, 3 (2002): 493–513; J.
Ferguson, “Seeing Like an Oil Company: Space, Security, and Global Capital in Neoliberal
Africa,” American Anthropologist 107, 3 (2005): 377–82; F. Miraftab, “Neoliberalism and Casua-
lization of Public Sector Services: The Case of Waste Collection Services in Cape Town, South
Africa,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 28, 1 (2004): 874–92.
12 S. Beaud and M. Pialoux, “Between ‘Mate’ and ‘Scab’: The Contradictory Inheritance of
French Workers in the Postfordist Factory,” Ethnography 2, 3 (2001): 323–55; S. Kasmir, “The
Mondragón Model as Post-Fordist Discourse: Considerations on the Production of Post-Fordism,”
Critique of Anthropology 19, 4 (1999): 379–400.
13 J. Comaroff and J. Comaroff, “Occult Economies and the Violence of Abstraction: Notes from
the South African Postcolony,” American Ethnologist 26, 2 (1999): 279–303; and “Millennial
Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming,” Public Culture 12, 2 (2000): 291–343.
14 Comaroff and Comaroff, “Millennial Capitalism”; A. Klima, “Spirits of ‘Dark Finance’ in
Thailand: A Local Hazard for the International Moral Fund,” Cultural Dynamics 18, 1 (2006):
33–60; S. Strange, Casino Capitalism (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
15 U. Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage, 1992).
16 For an insightful exposé, see B. Maurer, “The Anthropology of Money,” Annual Review of
Anthropology 35 (2006): 15–36.
17 See K. Polanyi. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time
(Boston: Beacon Hill, 1944). For recent explorations of his work, see K. Hart and C. M. Hann, eds.,
The Great Transformation Today (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
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of wealth. Even the redistribution of government social grants seems to
reconfigure kinship and neighborhood relations, aswell as violence within them.
The dependency on redistribution might revolutionize social relations as fun-
damentally as has the transformation of the colonial economy. The South
African case offers us the opportunity to examine what I will call “redistributive
economies”: economies in which people are connected to global markets
through a variety of redistributive arrangements such as those of social
grants, insurance companies, and prosperity churches. The constellation of
these economic practices suggests that redistribution is not only a form of econ-
omic integration that is entangled with a wide range of economic practices, but
also constitutes a field of economic contestations.18
I collected my data between 1995 and 2006 during several research stints that
ranged from a few weeks to a year in length, totaling about two and one-half
years. Most fieldwork was carried out in Cape Town, which is particularly
interesting due to the strong presence of the insurance industry: many South
African insurance companies are headquartered there. Central to the present
study is a comparison of the townships Indawo Yoxolo and Tembani.
Almost all of the residents of both are Xhosa, who with the abolition of apart-
heid left the impoverished bantustans of Ciskei and Transkei to try to earn
money in the city. In 1995, Indawo Yoxolo—situated between Philippi and
Mitchell’s Plain—was a small squatter camp. But over the years, with the
aid of governmental development funds, most of it was turned into a township
with electricity, sanitation, paved roads, schools, a clinic, and demarcated and
privately owned residential plots.19 Its residents are the poorest in Cape Town,
and many live in shacks of corrugated iron sheets, wood, or other available and
affordable building materials. During my fieldwork, unemployment was
rampant and even “lucky” residents earned very little, as security guards, clea-
ners, or nannies. Violence was a major concern, and there were several
murders. Notwithstanding the violence, and that most residents disliked
living in Indawo Yoxolo, there were many social activities that connected
neighbors, such as informal burial societies, credit groups, choirs, and small
independent churches that held their services in people’s living rooms.
Tembani is part of Cape Town’s largest African township of Khayelitsha. Its
residents are much wealthier than those of Indawo Yoxolo. Many work as
teachers, nurses, or civil servants, some are entrepreneurs, and most live in
privately owned, two- or three-bedroom brick houses. Some even own a car.
Violence was not nearly so rampant in Tembani, but it was difficult to
18 For an analysis of the power dynamics of the market and redistribution, see J. Roitman, Fiscal
Disobedience: An Anthropology of Economic Regulation in Central Africa (Princeton and London:
Princeton University Press, 2005).
19 E. Bähre, Money and Violence: Financial Self-Help Organizations in a South African Town-
ship (Leiden: Brill, 2007).
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conduct fieldwork there nonetheless, in the sense of being part of the commu-
nity, because neighbors interacted only sporadically, mostly to chase away
potential criminals. In addition to interviews, participant observation, and
other standard ethnographic research methods, I carried out a survey among
residents of both townships. In 2005 and 2006, my research assistant Edith
Moyikwa conducted a survey of 110 residents, about half of them from each
area, which included questions about social security, insurance, financial ser-
vices, livelihood strategies, and social relations.20
F I N A N C I A L MU T U A L S A N D R E C I P R O C I T Y
In order to understand the nexus of large-scale redistributions and social inter-
dependencies, it is vital to examine the reciprocal obligations within financial
mutuals such as informal savings and credit organizations and burial societies.
They reveal how mutual obligations among kin and neighbors changed as a
result of apartheid, and then with its collapse during the 1990s.21 In South
Africa, financial mutuals must be understood within the context of colonial
and apartheid legislation. Colonial and apartheid policies forced Africans to
IMAGE 1 Developed section of Indawo Yoxolo.
20 The threat of violence makes survey work a daunting task. Fortunately, my research assistant
Edith Moyikwa was robbed only once while carrying out the work. The survey was based on a
random sample in both areas, and people were approached at their homes. To ensure that the
employed were represented, most interviews were conducted in the evenings and on weekends.
When adults were absent, the children, who were usually present, would help to set up a more suit-
able meeting time.
21 For a more elaborate account, see Bähre, Money and Violence.
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live in native reserves, or bantustans, which marginalized Africans politically
and economically and led to the destruction of land and cattle.22 As a result,
fundamental kinship obligations of land inheritance and bridewealth or
lobola (cattle) were weakened, and wage-labor became increasingly important.
Due to the discriminatory apartheid labor laws, commonly referred to as “pass-
laws,” it was mostly men who left the impoverished bantustans to earn money
in cities such as Cape Town.23
In Cape Town, apartheid legislation forced men from particular districts in
the former bantustans to live together in designated barracks called
“hostels.” For example, all migrant men from Umtata, the capital of the Trans-
kei Bantustan, had to share the same overcrowded hostel room.24 Given that the
IMAGE 2 Tembani, Khayelitsha.
22 See R. Ross. A Concise History of South Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999), 51–52, 88; J. B. Peires, The Dead Will Arise: Nongqawuse and the Great Xhosa Cattle-
Killing Movement 1856–7 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1989).
23 On labor migration, see C. Bundy, The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry (London:
Heinemann, 1979), 225; and M. Hunter, “The Effects of Contact with Europeans on the Status of
Pondo Women,” Africa 6 (1933): 108. On gender and migration ratios, see M. Wilson and A.
Mafeje, Langa: A Study of Social Groups in an African Township (Cape Town: Oxford University
Press, 1963), 5; and Bundy, Rise and Fall, 229–300. On influx control in Cape Town, see
C. Besteman, Transforming Cape Town (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008); and I.
Goldin, Making Race: The Politics and Economics of Coloured Identity in South Africa (London
and New York: Longman, 1987).
24 M. Ramphele, “The Dynamics of Gender Politics in the Hostels of Cape Town: Another
Legacy of the South African Migrant Labour System,” Journal of Southern African Studies 15,
3 (1989): 396–97. Many Xhosa migrants lived in the city illegally and therefore could not find
formal employment.
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fellow migrants from one district—in Xhosa, abakhaya, or “those of one
home”—lived in each other’s vicinity, they could pool money to buy groceries,
and cook and eat together. This social integration was fundamental to the estab-
lishment of a variety of financial mutuals.25 Neighboring abakhaya would
place a fixed amount of money into a common fund, and in December
divide it among themselves. They could use their share to purchase a bus or
train ticket home or to financially support dependent relatives in the bantustans.
Burial societies guaranteed a decent burial back home instead of an embarras-
sing pauper’s grave in Cape Town.
With the end of the apartheid state, more people left the former bantustans of
Ciskei and Transkei for Cape Town. These migrants were no longer forced to
live together in barracks, and neighbors were rarely abakhaya anymore. As the
social proximity that determined social control among abakhaya waned, so did
the financial mutuals they had organized.26 Another consequence of apartheid’s
breakdown was that women, whose employment opportunities had been more
restricted, began to leave for the city.27 While financial mutuals among aba-
khaya men declined, female neighbors now started up their own. In Indawo
Yoxolo in 1997, women commonly joined as many as three, in which they cir-
culated up to one-third of their monthly incomes. Members often lived on the
same street, which allowed the social control necessary for balanced reciprocal
obligations.
Women’s financial mutuals must be understood vis-à-vis kinship relations, in
a way different from those of abakhayamen during apartheid. Women felt bur-
dened by the financial pressures of kin relationships, particularly those from
in-laws but also from husbands, boyfriends, and male siblings. Neighboring
women joined financial mutuals to ensure that the money they invested was
out of their hands. The social constraints within financial mutuals both
forced women to make regular contributions and ensured that relatives could
not get their hands on their money. Women were often secretive about their par-
ticipation in financial mutuals; even when a boyfriend or husband was aware
that they were taking part, they rarely knew how much money was pooled or
25 On abakhaya, see Bähre,Money and Violence; L. Bank, “The Social Life of Paraffin: Gender,
Domesticity and the Politics of Value in a South African Township,” African Studies 56, 2 (1997):
157–79; P. Mayer and I. Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen: Conservatism and the Process of Urban-
ization in a South African City (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974); andWilson and Mafeje,
Langa, 39–54. On social control in financial mutuals, see S. Ardener, “The Comparative Study of
Rotating Credit Associations,” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 94, 2 (1964): 201–29;
A. de Swaan and M. van der Linden, eds., Mutualist Microfinance: Informal Saving Funds in the
Periphery and in the Core? (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2006).
26 E. Bähre, “Changing Interdependencies and the State: How Financial Mutuals Have Changed
in South Africa,” in A. de Swaan and M. van der Linden, eds., Mutualist Microfinance: Informal
Saving Funds in the Periphery and in the Core? (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2006), 31–65.
27 See also D. James, Songs of the Women Migrants: Performance and Identity in South Africa
(London: Edinburgh University Press, 1999).
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when it was divided. Balanced reciprocal relations and social control helped
female neighbors to withstand some kinship obligations. Once the money
was divided, they often spent it on food, household items, and clothing, but
also to help their mothers and children.
To summarize, generalized reciprocity among kin diminished as a result of
the destruction of land and cattle that were so vital to the social reproduction
of kinship,28 as well as the brutal and discriminatory apartheid labor laws
that isolated wage-earning men from their wives, children, and other kin.
The money that was earned within the margins of an expanding capitalist
economy was pooled in neighborhood-based financial mutuals that functioned
according to the principle of balanced reciprocity. During apartheid these
neighbors, in Cape Town at least, were predominantly men “from the same
home” who used financial mutuals, at least ideally, to support dependent kin.
After apartheid, it was mostly female neighbors who established financial
mutuals, and they did so to withstand kinship obligations, particularly those
to in-laws, husbands, and boyfriends. In short, balanced reciprocity among
non-kin neighbors surfaced as generalized reciprocity among kin diminished.
R E D I S T R I B U T I O N I N T H E P O S T- F O R D I S T E C O N OMY
According to the 2004 Labour Force Survey of Statistics South Africa, unem-
ployment in the Western Cape was at 19 percent, far below the national average
of 27 percent. Moreover, from 2003 to 2004 the Western Cape had the coun-
try’s highest growth rate at 5.3 percent, well above the national average of
4.5 percent. This all indicated a fairly good job market overall, but if one con-
siders racial discrepancies, Africans were almost ten times as likely to be unem-
ployed as were Whites, and twice as likely as Coloureds.29 Due to the
continued dearth of jobs, more and more men and women have stopped
looking for work altogether, and government policy has become “the explicit
rejection of formal employment as the ‘normal’ frame of reference for social
policy.”30 Even if one does find a job, it will likely be as a poorly paid security
guard, cleaner, nanny, or casual laborer in the construction sector. Although
28 To some extent, cattle in bride wealth gifts are spoken of in monetary terms. Very few mar-
riages took place during my research. With respect to marriages and cattle, see W. Beinart, The Pol-
itical Economy of Pondoland, 1860–1930 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); J.
Comaroff and J. Comaroff, “Goodly Beasts, Beastly Goods: Cattle and Commodities in a South
African Context,” American Ethnologist 17, 2 (1990): 195–216; J. Ferguson, “The Bovine Mys-
tique: Power, Property and Livestock in Rural Lesotho,” Man 20, 4 (1985): 647–74; A. Kuper,
Wives for Cattle: Bridewealth and Marriage in Southern Africa (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1982).
29 Statistics South Africa, Provincial Profile Western Cape 2004 (2006), pp. 56, 70, at: www.
statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-00-91-01/Report-00-91-012004.pdf.
30 Ferguson, “Formalities of Poverty,” 76. On discouraged work-seekers, see Statistics South
Africa, Labour Force Survey, iv.
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labor remains for many Africans a vital source of income,31 as does the produce
from land and cattle,32 prolonged unemployment points toward a post-Fordist
economy. As hopes of gaining wealth through the world of work have declined,
so too have the financial mutuals that were historically part of the wage-labor
scene. In their absence, redistribution becomes ever more crucial both as an
economic reality and as a source of imagined riches.
Redistribution by development projects and social grants is at the heart of
post-apartheid government policy.33 The expansions of Black Economic
Empowerment policies, and even more so of social security and development
projects, are having fundamental socio-economic consequences. State redistri-
bution appears to be part of an emerging neo-patrimonialism. Niehaus has
revealed how in the northeast of South Africa people are pressured to vote for
the ANC in return for the welfare they receive.34 In Cape Town the situation is
somewhat different since the ANC has a much less control over the provincial
government there, while a fairly weak coalition headed by the Democratic Alli-
ance (DA) controls the Cape Town municipality. Toward the end of 2008, the
Congress of the People (COPE) became another contender for votes. The rela-
tively weak position of political parties in Cape Town makes redistribution ever
more important and a source of violent conflicts, which I have analyzed else-
where.35 Let us take a closer look at three different realms of redistribution—
social grants provided by the state, the expansion of insurance by commercial
companies, and the changing religious landscape—and how they relate to
mutual obligations and reciprocity among kin and neighbors.
S O C I A L G R A N T S
Social grants have existed in South Africa since the beginning of the twentieth
century, but Africans rarely had access to them. South Africa’s first social
assistance grants, under the Children’s Protection Act of 1913, were not avail-
able to Africans living in rural areas, and Africans in urban areas rarely received
them.36 The Old Age Pensions Act of 1928 only became available to Africans
31 Ibid., 23.
32 P. McAllister, “Maize Yields in the Transkei: How Productive Is Subsistence Cultivation?
Occasional Paper Series: Land Reform and Agrarian Change in Southern Africa,” Programme
for Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, 2000.
33 See J. Seekings and N. Nattrass, Race, Class, and Inequality in South Africa (New Haven:
Yale University Press 2005), 347; Ferguson, “Formalities of Poverty.” On development, see E.
Bähre, “How to Ignore Corruption: Reporting the Shortcomings of Development in South
Africa,” Current Anthropology 46, 1 (2005): 107–20.
34 I. Niehaus, “Doing Politics in Bushbuckridge: Work, Welfare and the South African Elections
of 2004,” Africa 76, 4 (2006): 526–48.
35 See E. Bähre, “Beyond Legibility: Violence, Conflict, and Development in a South African
Township,” African Studies 66, 1 (2007): 79–102.
36 K. Pauw and L. Mncube, “Expanding the Social Security Net in South Africa: Opportunities,
Challenges and Constraints, Development Policy Research Unit, Cape Town,” DPRU Working
Paper 07/127, 2007.
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in 1944, and even then the maximum pension for Whites was five times higher
than theirs.37 As a consequence of democratization, all South Africans became
eligible for social grants, of which there were also more types,38 and the
number of beneficiaries almost tripled between 1997 and 2007. This expansion
is particularly striking if one compares it with labor statistics: the number of
grant beneficiaries is 50 percent higher than the number of people paying
income taxes.39
These grants include monthly payments of food relief (R300), child support
(R230), foster care (R650), and care-dependency (R960), and a monthly old
age pension of R960.40 During my Cape Town fieldwork it became clear
that social workers encouraged people to apply for grants, even if they were
employed. I was told that some social workers emphasized job insecurity
and carefully hinted at the increasing incidence of HIV—the future was uncer-
tain, and it remained to be seen how much longer the government would con-
tinue to provide social grants. Even people with well-paying jobs were
sometimes urged to apply for disability grants, just to be sure.41
Social grants particularly affect parental authority since most beneficiaries
are parents or grandparents. A closer look at grant types and their distribution
clarifies this. From 1997 to 2006, social grants to foster parents grew by 42
percent annually. During the same period, the number of parents receiving a
child support grant grew by 37 percent annually. Of the total number of
social grants that the state distributed in 2006, almost 90 percent were for pen-
sioners (old age grants) and parents (child support grants).42 These grants do
not focus on work, as would be the case with, for example, bursaries that
enable young people to further their education, grants to the unemployed,
grants that make up losses of income during illness, or others related to the
world of work. Instead, and in sharp contrast to the welfare of Western
Europe and the United States,43 social grants in South Africa are directed
mostly at the aged and those raising children. Grants are relatively small and
their real value has decreased over the years.44 Nonetheless, for many
African young men and women it is more feasible to live with parents or
37 Pauw and Mncube, “Impact of Growth,” 12.
38 Seekings and Nattrass, Race, Class, and Inequality, 340–75.
39 Pauw and Mncube, “Impact of Growth,” 13.
40 See the website of the Department of Social Development: www.dsd.gov.za. The values given
were defined in October 2008.
41 On mental health and entitlement of grants, see also H. MacGregor. “‘The Grant Is what I
Eat’: The Politics of Social Security and Disability in the Post-Apartheid South African State,”
Journal of Biosocial Science 38, 1 (2005): 43–55.
42 Pauw and Mncube, “Expanding the Social Security Net,” 13, 47.
43 See A. de Swaan, “Elite Perceptions of the Poor: Reflections on a Comparative Research
Project,” in E. P. Reis and M. Moore, eds., Elite Perceptions of Poverty and Inequality (London,
New York, and Cape Town: Zed Books), 182–94.
44 Seekings and Nattrass, Race, Class, and Inequality, 361.
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grandparents who are receiving them than to seek jobs that do not exist. One
consequence of the shrinking labor market for the uneducated is that young
and able men and women increasingly depend on their parents’ or grandpar-
ents’ social grants.45
In the Eastern Cape town of Queenstown I interviewed a woman who was
well into her eighties. When I first met her in 1997, she and her husband
lived together alone, although she occasionally provided meals to visiting
grandchildren who lived nearby with their mother. By 2006, her husband
had died, her sole income was the state’s old age pension, and she had five teen-
agers living with her. The latter stayed for months, even several years, without
being able to make any financial contributions. Their parents occasionally sent
the woman some money, but it was very little to survive on. She complained
about having to feed all of these young people with her pension, although
she enjoyed their company when they were quiet and listened to her. Neverthe-
less, having little education, the teenagers remained dependent upon her.
Paradoxically, then, in many households it is the disabled, sick, and elderly
who generate income, not the young men and women in the prime of life.
Although social grants are relatively small, their impact on social dynamics,
particularly among parents and children, is substantial. For example, I met
one woman in the Eastern Cape town, Fort Beaufort, who lived together
with her adult son. She received an old age pension, at the time just over
R700, while her son earned a meager R200 per month as a full-time construc-
tion worker. When a pensioner’s government grant is more than three times the
salary of a young man, kinship relations are inevitably affected.
During conversations in Indawo Yoxolo and Tembani, a growing concern
became apparent that the provision of social grants would result in moral
degeneration. Many men and women saw unemployment as a result of individ-
ual behavior and fail to acknowledge the apparent structural conditions of the
job market.46 Despite ample indications that jobs were extremely hard to find,
parents complained frequently that their children, particularly the young men,
were lazy and found it all-too-comfortable to live off of their grant-receiving
parents or grandparents. Sometimes, these accusations would escalate. While
I interviewed a woman in Tembani, the conversation turned to the members
of her household, and I remarked that at an earlier meeting a young man was
45 M. S. Bertrand, S. Mullainathan, and D. Miller appear to be oblivious to the nexus of poverty
and household dynamics when they argue that what reduces the labor force among Africans is the
provision of pensions. See their paper, “Public Policy and Extended Families: Evidence from Pen-
sions in South Africa,”World Bank Economic Review 17, 1 (2003): 27–50. On the contrary, it is the
absence of labor that leaves young men and women with little alternative but to rely on social
assistance.
46 For a compelling argument on individualized explanations for the structural conditions of
unemployment in Northern Ireland, see L. Howe, “Scrounger, Worker, Beggarman, Cheat: The
Dynamics of Unemployment and the Politics of Resistance in Belfast,” Journal of the Royal
Anthropological Institute 4, 3 (1998): 531–50.
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living in their house but I did not see him anymore. She said that he had AIDS
and had gone to stay with relatives in the Eastern Cape and to die. She went on
to explain to me how lazy he was. Angrily, she said that he was too lazy to get
out of bed, to do any chores, and to even look for a job. When I suggested that
perhaps he was too sick, she denied this vehemently: he was lazy and used
AIDS as an excuse for not working.
When it came to girls, women in particular were worried that they would get
pregnant in order to be eligible for a child-maintenance grant. During several
interviews, they expressed their concerns about increasing teenage pregnan-
cies, the risks of unprotected sex, and the girls’ ignorance about child rearing
and the costs of living. One woman told me about an argument she had had
with her daughter of fourteen, who already had a child. During the argument,
her daughter threatened her mother by saying that she was going to have
more children, and could then leave her parental home and live on the state’s
child-maintenance grants. Irrespective of how justified these parental concerns
are, whether teenage pregnancies are increasing, and if so whether this is a
result of child-maintenance grants, social grants do affect kinship relations.
Instead of young men and women earning money, they are seen to be depen-
dent on their parents’ grants. Inevitably, this contributes to inter-generational
tensions.
Let me give one example of exactly how state redistribution by grants can
generate social tensions among kin. Sipho and his brother grew up with their
parents in the Eastern Cape. When Sipho was still young, not yet a teenager,
his father died. The brothers stayed with their mother, but before long she
too became ill, from AIDS, and her health deteriorated rapidly. The siblings
took care of her as best they could, helped out by their grandmother who
lived a few streets away. The brothers spent a lot of time with their grandmother
and usually she cooked dinner for them, and they moved in with her when their
mother died. Their father’s brother, who lived in the same town, sold their par-
ental home and took the proceeds. He officially adopted the two brothers and
consequently became the beneficiary of the child maintenance grant. The
grandmother continued to care for the two brothers, though she received no
financial compensation.
When relatives became aware of this situation, many became angry. They
thought it unjust that the uncle had adopted the orphans yet refused to take
care of them, and that he had adopted them only to get the grant. Soon after,
the grandmother also became ill and died of AIDS. Sipho and his brother
moved into their uncle’s home, which was a horrible experience for them.
The uncle was aggressive and abusive and treated his own children much
better. Sipho recalled the humiliation at dinner: with his brother he had to
stand and watch the family eat while they received nothing, and they often
went without food for days. Moreover, their uncle would beat them severely
and Sipho told me that he felt treated as a slave. When a relative from his
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mother’s side came to visit kin in the Eastern Cape, she had heard about the
horrible situation and decided to take Sipho with her to Cape Town. This
fuelled gossip within the family, mainly about the child-support grant, and
some suspected that she had taken him in order to cash in on it. She was
infuriated by these rumors, and assured me that she received no grant and
that the uncle was still the legal foster parent. She liked having Sipho in the
house; he was pleasant company and helped with chores. Sipho was also
very happy to have left his abusive uncle. Unfortunately, things took a turn
for the worse; while his aunt was hospitalized he accidentally wrecked two
cars, one belonging to the family and one to a family friend, and out of embar-
rassment but also fear of repercussions he immediately left the house. Irrespec-
tive of Sipho’s whereabouts, his uncle remained his legal guardian and received
the grant.
Instead of fighting over land and cattle, kinship ties are now dominated by
rumor and gossip concerning government grants. In the absence of wealth
gained through land, cattle, and income from work, redistribution is the econ-
omic game of a liberated South Africa. Comaroff and Comaroff47 have argued
that the reconfiguration of violence is a result of expanding global neoliberal
markets, but the dependency on government grants in the absence of jobs
suggests otherwise. This reveals not only a plurality of economic regimes,
which is also found elsewhere in Africa,48 but also that contestations over
mutual obligations and the reconfiguration of violence are results of govern-
ment redistribution.
C OMM E R C I A L I N S U R A N C E
Because commercial insurance is part of the realm of the market, it is not gen-
erally understood as a redistributive regime, even though risk mitigation does
take place by a pooling of money and its redistribution to those confronted with
specific adversities. Insurance reveals that redistribution is not confined to non-
market spaces, as Polanyi understood it.49 Redistribution has become part of
financial markets, particularly as Africans experience it.
During apartheid, insurance companies rarely served Africans or Coloureds,
not necessarily due to explicit racial policies but rather to marketing strategies
that excluded them. For example, insurers stipulated that clients had to have
completed a secondary education. Also, many policies were part of employ-
ment packages that were offered only to workers with permanent contracts.
Given the apartheid-era labor migration policies, this meant that few Africans
47 Comaroff and Comaroff, “Occult Economies”; and “Millennial Capitalism.”
48 See P. Shipton, “Luo Entrustment: Foreign Finance and the Soil of the Spirits in Kenya,”
Africa 65, 2 (1995): 165–96; J. Guyer, Marginal Gains: Monetary Transactions in Atlantic
Africa (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Roitman, Fiscal Disobedience.
49 Polanyi, Great Transformation.
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had insurance. During the past few years, insurance companies have expanded
their business to the lower end of the market. Our survey in Indawo Yoxolo and
Tembani found that fewer than 25 percent of the residents had no insurance,
while some had as many as nine policies. Of the respondents, 63 percent had
at least one funeral insurance policy, more than belonged to burial societies.
Unemployment insurance (UIF) was held by 44 percent, 27 percent had
medical aid, 26 percent a pension fund; and 24 percent a mortgage that included
an insurance policy.50 Respondent income was one of the strongest determi-
nants for having a policy.51 Almost all (96 percent) of those who earned
more than R4000 per month had at least one or were covered by a partner’s
policy. Even the poor respondents, most of whom lived in Indawo Yoxolo,
often had policies: 41 percent of those with incomes under R1000—about
US$100 and considerably less than a cleaner’s wage—had at least one.52
David Porteous, founder and director of Bankable Frontier Associates, a U.S.
consultancy firm focused on expanding financial services to the poor, envisions
a tremendous insurance market, even for the poorest quintile of society. He
identifies a market potential of over six million South African households,
which is almost ten times the current market.53 All major South African com-
panies have established specific units that target what insurers call the “lower
end of the market.” They have set up offices in the African and Coloured town-
ships and have started hiring more African and Coloured brokers. The brokers
visit people at their homes, and give presentations at local schools, police
stations, and medical centers; not even the military bases escape their atten-
tions. At a place of work, he (I encountered no female brokers) typically sets
up his overhead projector or posters in the staff room and explains his products
to the employees. Such presentations are now common; schoolteachers told me
that a few years ago no brokers visited their schools, but now they come to give
their sales pitches about once a month. In addition to brokers, insurance com-
panies have also started to liaise with a myriad of intermediary organizations.
Furniture stores, for example, sell insurance policies as part of the credit with
which customers buy their furniture. Supermarkets and other stores also sell
policies that have nothing to do with their core business, such as funeral
50 Other policies were the provident fund (16 percent), education policies (8 percent), car insur-
ances (8 percent), disability policies (5 percent), the insurance of loan installments on furniture (4
percent), and investment funds (4 percent).
51 Kendall’s tau_b 0,503, correlation significant at the 0.01 level, N = 110.
52 FinScope of 2003 states that almost nobody earning below R1000 a month has a policy.
Because the study on which the FinScope data is based is unavailable, even though the study
was publicly funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the reason
for this vast discrepancy remains unclear.
53 Porteous, “Access Frontier.” On marketing, see also E. Bähre, “Redes de inclusão e burocra-
cias de exclusão: Riscos e seguros de responsabilidade civil entre os mais pobres na África do Sul,”
Etnográfica 14, 3 (2010): 465–85.
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policies, or travel insurance that only covers accidents that may occur while tra-
veling from Cape Town to the Eastern Cape.
Part of the attraction of insurance policies is that they seem to offer an escape
from burdensome reciprocal relations, particularly among kin and neighbors.54
Many are eager to avoid such social entanglements. In Tembani I interviewed a
woman who lived together with her children and worked as a nurse in the
nearby hospital. She told me that she wanted nothing to do with her neighbors.
She explained that as soon as she moved into the house she decided to build a
wall around her plot, and that it had to be so high that passersby would be
unable to look inside, even if they jumped. She said she already had too
many worries and did not want to be bothered by other people’s problems.
The wall led to a dispute with her next-door neighbors when they had laid
out their washing on the wall to dry in the sun. This angered her, so she told
them: “This is my wall, I built it on my plot and so the outside of the wall is
also mine! I do not want you to use it for your laundry!” Others had similar
concerns. High walls surrounded many other plots in Tembani, ensuring disen-
gagement from neighbors. Further, children rarely played on the street, and
some parents reprimanded their children when they played with neighboring
children in their neighbor’s front yard. They explained to them that they
should not invade their neighbor’s privacy.
In Tembani, people spoke of some people as “friends.” This seemed to be a
new form of identification, which I had not encountered in Indawo Yoxolo.
There, people were neighbors, kin, members of the same church, colleagues
and so on, but were never referred to as friends. In Tembani, friendship
appeared to have emerged as a distinct form of identification. Friends would
live elsewhere and visit by car, have tea, or talk about their concerns. Mutual
obligations among friends appeared to be fewer than among neighbors,
because friendship offered fewer opportunities for social control.
The survey data confirms that people with insurance policies are involved in
fewer reciprocal obligations with neighbors (see table 1). To gain insight into
generalized reciprocity, respondents were asked how often they have a neigh-
bor over to eat a meal. In Indawo Yoxolo, about 25 percent of respondents said
that this happened more than once a week, whereas in Tembani only 9 percent
did. A closer look at financial mutuals provides greater insight into balanced
reciprocity among neighbors. In Indawo Yoxolo, 60 percent of the respondents
participated with neighbors in a financial mutual, but in Tembani only 14
percent did. Moreover, in Indawo Yoxolo, 42 percent (strongly) preferred
burial societies based on balanced reciprocity to funeral insurance, while in
Tembani only 9 percent said this.
54 For a more elaborate analysis of the pressures on reciprocal relations among kin and neigh-
bors, see E. Bähre, “Reluctant Solidarity: Death, Urban Poverty and Neighbourly Assistance in
South Africa,” Ethnography 8, 1 (2007): 33–59.
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Questions were also asked about social capital. Social capital was measured
as a compound variable of answers to: (a) How often do you have a neighbor
over to eat? (b) How often does a neighbor ask you for money? and (c) How
many financial mutuals do you participate in? The data suggests that people
that spend more on insurance tend to have less social capital.55 It appears
that insurance offers an escape from the financial pressures that are part of
social relationships.
But insurance is not just an escape; it can lead to disputes among kin and
neighbors, and a configuration of violence within intimate relations. For
example, my research assistant Edith Moyikwa was involved in organizing
the funeral of a relative when she noticed that a fairly distant relative contrib-
uted the huge sum of R1000 toward the funeral costs. The relative requested in
return only a copy of the death certificate. She had been equally generous at
other funerals, which raised people’s suspicions. Edith, partly as a consequence
of her involvement in this study, suggested that this relative might well be
taking out funeral policies on others. They confronted the woman with this
and she admitted that this was what she was doing. Whenever a relative or
neighbor was ill, she would take out a R10,000 funeral policy on that
person’s life. After the person died, she donated R1000 in return for the
death certificate, which she needed to make her claim to the insurer. She
would then keep the remaining R9000. The woman’s relatives were furious
and accused her of witchcraft: she was killing people to make money. The
woman defended her practice by saying that she was trying to help people
and that she had meant no harm. I encountered a widespread concern that
someone will gain financially by one’s death. Many hide their policies from
others, and even spouses and siblings would not tell each other about them.
Many were worried that insurance policies gave the policyholder an interest
in the death of a family member.
TABLE 1.
Neighborhood relations and insurance in Indawo Yoxolo and Tembani (n = 110).
Indawo Yoxolo Tembani
Most frequent income R1500–2500 Over R4000
Participates in neighborhood-based financial mutual 60 percent 14 percent
(Strongly) prefers burial society to funeral insurance 42 percent 9 percent
Has a neighbor over to eat more than once a week 25 percent 9 percent
Mean number of insurance policies 1,8 3,2
55 The relation was significant at the 0.05 level, with a Pearson correlation of -0,229.
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Commercial insurance might be considered as the pinnacle of global finan-
cial capital. At first glance, it does seem that conflicts over mutual obligations
are a result of neoliberalism or millennial capitalism. However, the intensified
marketization of insurance is simultaneously an expansion of a redistributive
economy. Acknowledging that insurances are also redistributive regimes
reveals that people are caught up in economies that imply solidarities, entitle-
ments, and obligations that are quite different and at times contradictory.
R E L I G I O U S R I C H E S
Redistribution has also become part of South Africa’s religious landscape. One
way this is apparent is in the cooperation between insurance companies and
churches. In 1989, the insurance company African Life and the leadership of
the Zion Christian Church (ZCC) launched a funeral policy for ZCC
members only. This policy grew most quickly in the mid-1990s. It was admi-
nistered largely by ZCC members who collect the premiums and register pay-
ments. They also helped with the administration of claims, clarified potential
misunderstandings about the legitimacy of claims, and dealt with other
insurance-related issues, including conflicts among relatives over the allocation
of benefits. For insurers, cooperation with the church had many advantages,
most obviously that the ZCC offered up to four million clients with low admin-
istration costs.
Another example is the recent cooperation between the insurer Safrican and
the prosperity church Assemblies of God. Safrican is largely owned by the
Black Economic Empowerment company called Thebe Investment
Company, and since 2007 it has been the underwriter of the funeral services
for the Assemblies of God of Southern Africa. Safrican taught a group of
Assemblies of God members about its policies, no doubt to ensure that they
could then sell them to other congregation members.56 Cooperation between
insurance companies and churches is indicative of a post-Fordist economy in
South Africa. For insurance companies, it no longer suffices to sell via interme-
diaries like employers and unions. Churches have become a new intermediary
in an economy where large-scale redistribution appears to be replacing labor as
a source of wealth, both real and imagined.57
The growth of prosperity churches in post-apartheid South Africa suggests
that large-scale redistribution has a stronger appeal than does mutual support
among church members. Although increasing numbers of people are not
affiliated with a church—in the survey 40 percent were not affiliated with
any religion—prosperity churches such as the Universal Church of the
56 See the press release of 11 Sept. 2007: http://www.safrican.co.za/content.html?
navID=45&contentID=36.
57 For a fascinating argument on urban poverty, social organizations, and labor, see M. Davis,
Planet of Slums (London: Verso, 2006).
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Kingdom of God (UCKG), Apostolic Faith Mission, and the Assemblies of
God have become more prominent. Some 18 percent of the respondents that
did belong to a church belonged to one of these.58 These churches are hierarchi-
cally organized and maintain a strong focus on financial donations.59 They
aggressively urge their congregations to donate large sums of money and
promise them vast riches in return. The South African website of the Assem-
blies of God is particularly revealing.60 It gives an initial impression of being
the homepage of a lifestyle magazine. One sees a highly stylized living room
with a leather chair, a large flat-screen television in the bookcase, and an
iPod on a side table. These consumer items offer links that provide brief infor-
mation about the church, such as an address or photographs. Only two links
provide details: one takes visitors to a website on donating money, and the
other takes them to a website on social development entitled, “Over the
Wall: Access to Resources.” The only substantial links that Assemblies of
God offers are about large-scale redistribution: donating money to the
church, and access to resources.
The emphasis of redistribution is even more prominent in the fast-growing
Universal Church of the Kingdom of God. In 1997, The UCKG had only
one church in Cape Town, which held its services in an abandoned factory
hall in Woodstock. Ten years later, there were thirty branches. This church of
Brazilian origin and with Brazilian priests promised its members great
wealth and prosperity.61 Priests preached that tremendous wealth awaited the
congregation: a big house, or a luxury car, mostly BMWs. They explained
that this wealth had to be “unblocked” through fierce and intensive prayer
and large donations to the church. Poor men and women, some earning less
than R1000 a month, donated hundreds of rand at prayer services, which
spurred congregations into competing with donations. Members gave as
much as they possibly could, particularly during the Campaign of Israel. In
this campaign, the priests preached that individual members had to write
down their prayers, which would be taken to Israel. To make sure that God lis-
tened to the prayers, members had to donate as much money as they could.
I spoke with one woman living in Khayelitsha who told me with some embar-
rassment that she had sold everything but the clothes on her own back and
given all the money to the church just to make sure that her prayers would
go through. Her sister, who had an affair with the priest, had done exactly
the same. No riches appeared, and both were upset and eventually left the
58 Of the respondents that belonged to a church, 11 percent were Anglicans and 23 percent
Methodists. These are much smaller numbers than were found to belong to those churches in
1960. See Wilson and Mafeje, Langa, 92.
59 On the UCKG, see Van Wyk, “Profit Prophets.” On hierarchy in the Assemblies of God, see
Helgesson, “Walking in the Spirit,” ch. 5.
60 At: http://www.assemblies.org.za/.
61 See also Van Wyk, “Profit Prophets.”
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church. The woman was also angry with her sister for having secretly kept one
set of clothing for herself: “Why did you not tell me that you did not sell every-
thing? Then I would have also kept an extra set of clothing for myself.” She felt
cheated by both her sister and the church. When I interviewed her, she had
found employment as a cleaner, while her sister—the priest had left South
Africa without telling anyone—had found a job picking grapes.
Though the histories of these three prosperity churches are very different,
today they are all concerned with large-scale redistribution through hierarchical
relations. In sharp contrast to the Zion churches, there are hardly any reciprocal
relations among congregation members. Assistance among UCKG members
was limited to prayers given, and other forms of mutual support, either financial
or by helping people to find a job or run their household, were strongly discour-
aged. The churches also discourage kinship relations, since the congregation
has to renounce ritual ties to their ancestors. The ancestors are fundamental
to mutual kinship obligations such as funerals, slaughtering of cattle for ances-
tors, and the initiation of boys into manhood. When people stop taking part in
these events then kinship obligations are diluted. Indeed, this may well be one
of the attractions of these churches. Mutual obligations, after all, offer no pros-
perity, while the idea of religious riches through large-scale redistribution offers
hope.
The hope for wealth in a liberated South Africa, then, is also apparent in the
religious landscape, both in insurance offered in conjunction with churches and
the growing popularity of prosperity churches that discourage mutual obli-
gations and preach an ontology of large-scale redistribution. The dynamics
of the country’s changing religious landscape vis-à-vis insurance and redistri-
bution require closer analysis. Redistribution through prosperity churches is
particularly salient since it most strongly reveals the discrepancy between
ideology and practice—the ideology is one of redistribution from God, while
the practice is that church leaders enrich themselves at the expense of their con-
gregations and their dependents. Yet merely pointing out the exploitative char-
acter of such practices cannot explain the attraction of these churches. To
paraphrase Weber, prosperity churches seem to indicate a “spirit of redistribu-
tive economies,” with an almost millenarian but also quite fleeting trust in the
power of redistribution.
C O N C L U S I O N S A N D I M P L I C AT I O N S
Redistributive economies are central to the reconfiguration of sociality and vio-
lence. In South Africa, political liberation was followed by a surge in
large-scale redistributive institutions through the state, markets, and churches.
Many South Africans try to understand why some people have benefited from
political liberation while so many others are worse off than before. Unemploy-
ment among the poor and uneducated has only worsened since 1994, while
redistributions of social grants, development aid, insurance benefits, and the
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promise of religious riches have increased dramatically. Increasing numbers of
people have had to rely on redistribution, as mutual obligations among kin and
neighbors have become increasingly fragile, largely due to HIV, poverty, and
violence. Redistribution has become the major source of real and imagined
wealth, and is therefore pivotal to the reconfiguration of sociality.
This study reveals redistribution’s impact on mutual dependencies and how it
can lead to conflicts between kin and neighbors. The poor, without jobs or
businesses, are especially caught up in a plurality of redistributive economic
practices that lead to tensions over obligations and entitlements.62 Social
grants generate concerns about the moral degeneration of youth, and increase
their dependency on parents or grandparents; insurance policies help policy-
holders and their dependents to overcome adversities, but also lead to conflicts
over mutual obligations. Today, the poor take out policies on the lives of others
and are treated with suspicion due to the interest they have in other people’s
adversities. Prosperity churches urge people to break off reciprocal relations
and then disappoint congregations when priests suddenly leave and religious
riches fail to materialize. Residents of Tembani develop a new social category,
friendships, without financial obligations. These patterns display how the
rapidly expanding redistributive economy can be conducive but also detrimen-
tal to reciprocal relations, and how it offers opportunities for both mutual
support and exploitation. Redistributive economies can bring about conflicts
over wealth and broad reconfigurations of sociality and violence.
Comaroff and Comaroff attribute violence to the opacity of wealth in neolib-
eral economies.63 I argue that the amalgamation of a wide range of redistribu-
tive economic regimes causes the reconfiguration of sociality and violence.
This process does not exclude the neoliberal market but is certainly not
limited to it. The conflicts that Comaroff and Comaroff examine are also at
the heart of government grants, development projects, black economic empow-
erment requirements, and the wealth that prosperity churches promise. Fergu-
son has recently argued that neoliberal policies offer ideological support for
welfare provisions.64 His fascinating study supports the idea that neoliberal
policies support welfare, most notably through the state’s healthy tax base
but also due to processes of identification. Yet, do not forget that many influ-
ential South African politicians frequently denounce neoliberalism, and this
cannot be put aside as mere political rhetoric. The centrality of a wide
variety of redistributive regimes in South Africa offers us another perspective
62 On the plurality of economic regimes, see Guyer, Marginal Gains; and Roitman, Fiscal Dis-
obedience. On the role of churches in the plurality of economic regimes see D. Akin, “Cash and
Shell Money in Kwaio, Solomon Islands,” in D. Akin and J. Robbins, eds.,Money and Modernity:
State and Local Currencies in Melanesia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999),
103–30.
63 Comaroff and Comaroff, “Occult Economies,” 288.
64 Ferguson, “Formalities of Poverty.”
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on the reconfiguration of sociality and violence that does not exclude the
market but is not limited to it.
At a time when many of the poor now care little about the market, and pin
their hopes instead on redistribution, it seems beside the point to belabor redis-
tribution’s social embeddedness. However, this rests on the problematic dis-
tinction between market and non-market exchange that locates redistribution
squarely in the realm of the latter.65 Commercial insurance is a form of redis-
tribution: money is collected into a fund from which it is redistributed to assist
in times of adversity. Whether prosperity churches are part of the market is
open to scholarly debate, but I argue that its promises of wealth follow the
logics of large-scale redistribution. Congregations ostentatiously pool money
in church funds and expect that God will return vast riches to them.
Rather than dwelling on distinct economic spheres, it is more fruitful, as
Guyer among others has noted, to study “the historical constitution of conver-
sions and wealth creation, under turbulent conditions.”66 The present study has
shown that redistribution is part of the market (insurance policies) but also more
than the market (social grants, development aid, religious riches). Scrutinizing
the sociality of these redistributive regimes more fully captures the post-
apartheid economy than does a study that takes the primacy of the market at
its point of departure. We need to explore how redistributive economies are
entangled with processes of democratization; how they can generate new feud-
alisms and neopatrimonialisms; how they engender new ontologies of wealth;
and how the resulting reconfigurations of sociality, particularly in the intimate
realm, cause new socio-economic formations.
65 See, among others, the canonical studies by Polanyi, Great Transformation; and G. Simmel,
The Philosophy of Money (London and New York: Routledge, 1900).
66 Quotation from Guyer, Marginal Gains, 30. See also Roitman, Fiscal Disobedience; and
Akin, “Cash and Shell Money.” On spheres of exchange, see P. Bohannan, “Some Principles of
Exchange and Investment among the Tiv,” American Anthropologist 57, 1 (1955): 60–70.
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